"Morality requires God"

The claim that morality requires God is one of the most influential arguments in Christian apologetics and theistic philosophy more broadly. It takes several forms: divine command theory, which holds that moral obligations are constituted by God's commands; the moral argument for God's existence, which argues that objective moral values require a divine foundation; and the popular assertion that without God, "everything is permitted."¹ These arguments have a long pedigree in Western philosophy and remain central to contemporary apologetics. However, they face serious philosophical objections that have been recognized since antiquity, and they are challenged by empirical evidence from anthropology, evolutionary biology, and sociology suggesting that morality has natural origins and that secular societies can maintain robust moral standards.

Divine command theory

Divine command theory (also known as theological voluntarism) is the meta-ethical position that an action's moral status is determined by whether God commands or forbids it. On this view, moral obligations are grounded in divine commands: an action is morally obligatory because God commands it, morally forbidden because God prohibits it, and morally permissible because God permits it.¹ The theory has been defended by philosophers including William of Ockham in the medieval period and, in modified forms, by contemporary philosophers such as Robert M. Adams, Philip L. Quinn, and William P. Alston.^{1, 2}

The appeal of divine command theory lies in its apparent ability to ground objective moral obligations in an authoritative source external to human preferences. If God commands that murder is wrong, then murder is wrong not merely because humans dislike it or have agreed to prohibit it, but because the sovereign of the universe has decreed it. This seems to provide the kind of objective moral foundation that many theists seek.¹

However, divine command theory faces a fundamental logical problem that has been recognized for over two thousand years: the Euthyphro dilemma.

The Euthyphro dilemma

The Euthyphro dilemma takes its name from Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, written around 399 BCE. In the dialogue, Socrates encounters Euthyphro, a religious expert who is prosecuting his own father for murder. Socrates asks Euthyphro to define piety (holiness), and after several failed attempts, Euthyphro proposes that piety is what is loved by the gods. Socrates then poses the question that has echoed through philosophy ever since: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"³

Translated into monotheistic terms relevant to divine command theory, the dilemma becomes: Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?^{1, 2}

Each horn of this dilemma creates serious problems for divine command theory. If we take the first horn and say that things are good because God commands them, then morality becomes arbitrary. God could have commanded torture, genocide, or child sacrifice, and those acts would then be morally obligatory. There would be no principled reason why God commanded what he did; his commands are brute facts without rational justification. This makes morality seem disturbingly contingent and removes any basis for saying that God himself is good in any meaningful sense, since "good" just means "whatever God commands."^{1, 2}

If we take the second horn and say that God commands things because they are good, then goodness exists independently of God. Moral truths are not constituted by divine commands but recognized by God and transmitted to us. This preserves the rationality and necessity of morality, but it undermines divine command theory. God becomes merely a messenger of moral truths that exist apart from him. If goodness is independent of God, then we do not need God to have morality; we can, in principle, access these moral truths directly.^{1, 2}

Contemporary defenders of divine command theory have proposed various solutions. Robert Adams developed a modified divine command theory that grounds morality in the commands of a loving God, arguing that God's nature constrains what he can command.¹ Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann appealed to the doctrine of divine simplicity, arguing that God and goodness are identical, not separate things.² William Lane Craig has argued that God's nature is the standard of goodness, and his commands flow necessarily from that nature.⁴ Critics respond that these solutions either collapse into the second horn of the dilemma (by making goodness prior to commands) or fail to escape arbitrariness (by making God's nature the unexplained ground of morality).^{1, 2}

Moral ontology and moral epistemology

A crucial distinction often blurred in popular discussions of morality and God is the difference between moral ontology and moral epistemology.⁵ Moral ontology concerns the metaphysical status of moral truths: do objective moral facts exist, and if so, what is their nature? Moral epistemology concerns how we come to know moral truths: how do we acquire moral knowledge?^{5, 6}

These are distinct questions that can have independent answers. It is logically possible that objective moral facts exist but that we have no reliable way to know them. Conversely, it is possible that we have strong moral intuitions that do not correspond to any objective moral reality.⁵ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that moral epistemology "is not totally disconnected, but is distinct from, moral ontology."⁶

This distinction matters because the argument that "morality requires God" often conflates two different claims. The ontological claim is that without God, there would be no objective moral facts. The epistemological claim is that without God (or divine revelation), we could not know what is morally right and wrong.⁵ Even if one were to grant the ontological claim, it would not follow that we need God to know the difference between right and wrong. And even if one grants the epistemological claim, it would not follow that God is the ground of morality's existence.

The empirical evidence reviewed below bears primarily on the epistemological question. If humans across cultures, religions, and even species demonstrate moral intuitions and behaviors, this suggests that we can access moral knowledge without divine revelation. It does not by itself settle the ontological question of whether moral facts ultimately depend on God, but it does undermine the practical claim that without God, humans would have no moral compass.

Cross-cultural moral universals

One of the most significant findings from anthropology is that certain moral rules appear to be universal across human cultures, regardless of their religious traditions. If morality were entirely dependent on divine commands specific to particular religions, we would expect to see radical moral diversity across cultures with different gods and different scriptures. Instead, research has documented striking moral commonalities.^{7, 8}

In 2019, Oliver Scott Curry, Daniel Austin Mullins, and Harvey Whitehouse of Oxford's Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology published the largest cross-cultural survey of morals ever conducted. Their study, published in Current Anthropology, analyzed ethnographic accounts of ethics from 60 societies around the world, comprising over 600,000 words from more than 600 sources.^{7, 8}

The researchers tested the theory of "morality as cooperation," which holds that morality evolved to promote cooperative behavior in social groups. They identified seven types of cooperative behavior that their theory predicted would be considered morally good: helping family, helping one's group, reciprocating favors, being brave, deferring to superiors, dividing resources fairly, and respecting others' property.⁷

Seven moral rules found across 60 cultures^{7, 8}

The findings were striking: these seven cooperative behaviors were always considered morally good in every society examined. The researchers found examples of most of these morals in most societies, with no counter-examples: no societies considered any of these behaviors morally bad. Most significantly, these morals were observed with equal frequency across all continents. They were not the exclusive preserve of Western civilization, Judeo-Christian cultures, or any particular religious tradition.^{7, 8}

While all societies agreed on these basic moral rules, they varied in how they prioritized or ranked them. This variation explains genuine moral disagreement across cultures, but the underlying agreement on the basic categories of moral behavior suggests a common foundation that transcends particular religious traditions.⁷ The Golden Rule, for example, appears in some form in Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and secular philosophical traditions, suggesting that reciprocity is a moral insight humans arrive at independently of any particular revelation.⁹

Evolutionary origins of morality

Perhaps the most significant challenge to the claim that morality requires God comes from evolutionary biology and primatology, which have documented moral behaviors in non-human animals. If empathy, fairness, and cooperation exist in species that clearly have no religion, this suggests that the building blocks of morality are products of evolution rather than divine revelation.^{10, 11}

Frans de Waal, the Dutch-American primatologist who spent decades studying chimpanzees and bonobos at Emory University, made the case for evolutionary morality in works including Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (2006) and The Bonobo and the Atheist: In Search of Humanism Among the Primates (2013). De Waal argued that human morality is not imposed from above but emerges from within, as a product of our evolutionary history as social animals.^{10, 11}

De Waal documented extensive evidence of proto-moral behavior in primates. Chimpanzees console distressed group members, putting an arm around them or grooming them. Bonobos share food with unrelated individuals, sometimes even offering the choice bits. Capuchin monkeys reject unequal pay, refusing to accept a lesser reward when they see another monkey receiving a better one for the same task. Chimpanzees go on risky patrols to protect their group, including non-kin members.^{10, 11}

De Waal identified empathy as the foundation of moral behavior. Empathy, the ability to share and understand the emotional states of others, appears to be widespread among mammals. It allows individuals to respond appropriately to the distress of others and to coordinate cooperative activities. De Waal rejected what he called "veneer theory," the view that morality is a thin cultural overlay on an otherwise selfish and violent nature. Instead, he argued, moral intuitions are deeply rooted in our biology.^{10, 11}

Research on the evolutionary origins of altruism has identified several mechanisms by which cooperative behavior can evolve. Kin selection explains why organisms help relatives who share their genes. Reciprocal altruism explains cooperation between unrelated individuals who interact repeatedly and can punish defectors. Group selection, though more controversial, may explain why traits that benefit the group can spread even at some cost to individuals.¹² A 2014 study from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology found that spontaneous, altruistic behavior is found in species that practice cooperative breeding, where young are cared for not only by mothers but also by siblings, fathers, grandmothers, aunts, and uncles.¹³

Neuroscience has begun to identify the neural mechanisms underlying moral cognition. Mirror neurons, brain cells that respond both when an animal performs an action and when it observes another performing the same action, have been proposed as a neural basis for empathy. A UCLA study found that mirror neuron activity predicted people's decision-making in moral dilemmas: people with greater neural resonance when watching someone experience pain were less likely to choose to cause harm to others.¹⁴ While the exact role of mirror neurons remains debated, the broader point stands: moral cognition has identifiable neural correlates that are shared across species, suggesting biological rather than supernatural origins.¹⁴

Secular ethical frameworks

Philosophy has developed multiple sophisticated ethical frameworks that make no appeal to divine commands. These secular approaches demonstrate that robust moral reasoning is possible without theistic foundations.^{15, 16}

Utilitarianism, developed by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), holds that the right action is the one that maximizes overall happiness or well-being and minimizes suffering. On this view, morality is about consequences: an action's moral worth is determined by its effects on the welfare of all those affected. Utilitarianism requires no divine authority; its foundation is the uncontroversial premise that pleasure is good and pain is bad, combined with the principle that everyone's welfare counts equally.^{15, 16}

Deontological ethics, most famously developed by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), holds that the morality of an action depends on whether it conforms to moral rules or duties, regardless of its consequences. Kant's categorical imperative, "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law," provides a rational test for moral principles without appeal to divine command. While Kant himself was a theist, his ethical system was explicitly grounded in reason alone, demonstrating that rigorous moral philosophy can proceed independently of theology.^{15, 17}

Virtue ethics, with roots in Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and developed by contemporary philosophers including Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, focuses not on rules or consequences but on character. The central question is not "What should I do?" but "What kind of person should I be?" Virtues such as courage, temperance, justice, and practical wisdom are understood as character traits that enable human flourishing. This framework grounds morality in human nature and the conditions for a good life, not in divine commands.^{16, 18}

Social contract theory, developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and revived by John Rawls (1921–2002), grounds moral and political obligations in agreements among rational individuals. Hobbes argued that rational self-interest leads people to consent to a sovereign authority to escape the "war of every man against every man." Rawls proposed a thought experiment in which rational people, behind a "veil of ignorance" about their own place in society, would choose principles of justice that protect the least advantaged. These frameworks derive moral principles from reason and mutual agreement, not divine revelation.^{19, 20}

These secular frameworks are not without their problems and critics. Utilitarianism faces objections about the measurement of happiness and the potential sacrifice of individuals for aggregate welfare. Deontology faces objections about conflicting duties and the inflexibility of rules. Virtue ethics faces objections about cultural relativism in defining virtues. Social contract theory faces objections about the treatment of those outside the contract. But these are problems internal to the frameworks, debated by philosophers for centuries; they do not show that secular ethics is impossible, only that it is difficult, as is all ethics, including theistic ethics.^{15, 16}

Secular societies and moral outcomes

If morality requires God, we would expect highly religious societies to demonstrate superior moral outcomes and highly secular societies to suffer from moral decay. The empirical evidence suggests the opposite.^{21, 22}

Phil Zuckerman, a sociologist at Pitzer College who spent a year studying Denmark and Sweden, documented his findings in Society without God: What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell Us About Contentment (2008). Zuckerman noted that Denmark and Sweden are "probably the least religious countries in the world, and possibly in the history of the world." Only 10% of Swedes, 19% of Danes, and 21% of Norwegians say religion is very important in their lives.^{22, 23}

Rather than being rife with moral depravity, these highly secular nations consistently rank among the world's best on measures of societal well-being. They have among the lowest violent crime rates in the world, the lowest levels of corruption, some of the lowest rates of infant mortality, the highest life expectancy, the most educated populations, and the highest levels of reported happiness.^{21, 22}

Gregory Paul's 2005 study "Cross-National Correlations of Quantifiable Societal Health with Popular Religiosity and Secularism in the Prosperous Democracies," published in the Journal of Religion and Society, systematically compared first-world developed countries on measures of religiosity and social dysfunction. Paul found that in almost all regards, the highly secular democracies consistently enjoy low rates of societal dysfunction, while more religious societies, particularly the United States, perform worse.²⁴

Religiosity and societal outcomes in developed democracies^{21, 24}

Within the United States, Paul found that the more strongly theistic, anti-evolution southern and midwestern states had markedly worse homicide, mortality, STD, and teen pregnancy rates than the northeastern states, where rates of secularization approach European norms.²⁴ More recent research has confirmed these patterns, with multiple studies finding negative correlations between religiosity and various measures of societal health across nations.²¹

These correlations do not prove that secularism causes better moral outcomes. The relationship may be reversed: perhaps economic security and social stability lead both to lower religiosity and to better outcomes. Or there may be confounding variables. Paul acknowledged that his study was "a first, brief look" at the subject, not a definitive causal analysis.²⁴ What the data do show, however, is that secular societies are not plagued by moral collapse. The claim that without God there can be no morality is contradicted by the lived experience of hundreds of millions of people in highly secular nations who maintain moral behavior, strong social bonds, and flourishing societies.^{21, 22}

Religion and moral failure

If morality requires God and divine revelation provides moral guidance, we would expect religious individuals and institutions to demonstrate superior moral conduct. History provides abundant counter-examples. Religious belief has not only failed to prevent atrocities but has in many cases provided justification for them.^{25, 26}

The Atlantic slave trade was explicitly justified using biblical passages. Sixteenth and seventeenth-century theologians invoked the "Curse of Ham" from Genesis 9, claiming that Africans were descended from Noah's cursed son and were therefore destined for slavery. Slave traders and slaveholders cited New Testament passages in which Saint Peter told slaves to "be submissive to your masters with all fear" and Saint Paul urged slaves to "be obedient to those who are your masters according to the flesh."²⁵ For nearly five centuries, religious authorities taught that a Hebrew prophet had condemned millions of Africans to slavery. The Bible does not actually curse Africans or dark-skinned people, but the religious interpretation dominated for centuries.²⁵

The Inquisitions, lasting from the twelfth century through the nineteenth, used religious authority to identify and punish heresy through torture and execution. The Spanish Inquisition targeted Jews and Muslims who had converted to Christianity but were suspected of secretly practicing their former faiths. Violence, isolation, and torture were used to extract confessions and denunciations.²⁶ The witch trials of the early modern period, enabled by religious belief in demonic forces, led to the prosecution of approximately 100,000 people and the execution of 40,000 to 60,000, more than three-fourths of them women.²⁷

The Crusades, a series of religious wars launched by Christian powers to control the Holy Land, included episodes of extreme violence. During the First Crusade's capture of Jerusalem in 1099, Crusaders massacred the city's Jewish and Muslim inhabitants, men, women, and children, in what contemporaries described as streets running with blood.²⁸ These atrocities were committed not in spite of religious belief but because of it, with participants believing they were doing God's will.

More recent history includes the religious dimensions of the Northern Ireland conflict, the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in justifying ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, the use of religious rhetoric to justify violence against abortion providers, and the invocation of religious authority to oppose civil rights for women and LGBTQ+ individuals. None of this proves that religion always leads to immorality, but it thoroughly refutes the claim that religious belief is a reliable guarantee of moral behavior.²⁹

Pre-Christian ethical systems

The claim that morality requires God is further undermined by the existence of sophisticated ethical systems that developed independently of biblical revelation. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle produced comprehensive moral philosophies in ancient Greece centuries before Christianity. Confucius developed an ethical system centered on benevolence and moral cultivation in sixth-century BCE China. The Buddha taught an ethical system based on compassion and the elimination of suffering in India around the same period. Jainism developed one of the most rigorous systems of non-violence in human history. None of these traditions derive from or depend upon the Bible, yet each produced moral frameworks of enduring intellectual depth.³⁰

Problems with biblical morality

The claim that the Bible provides the foundation for objective morality must also reckon with the content of biblical morality itself. The Bible explicitly permits and regulates slavery in multiple passages: Leviticus 25:44–46 permits acquiring slaves from surrounding nations; Exodus 21:2–11 regulates Hebrew slavery; and Ephesians 6:5 instructs slaves to "obey your earthly masters with respect and fear." No biblical passage unequivocally condemns the institution of slavery, a fact recognized and exploited by defenders of slavery in the antebellum American South, who argued—correctly—that the Bible permitted the practice.^{31, 32}

Multiple passages in the Hebrew Bible describe or command the killing of entire populations, including women and children. In 1 Samuel 15:3, God commands Saul to "put to death men and women, children and infants." In Deuteronomy 20:16–17, the Israelites are commanded to "not leave alive anything that breathes." The Bible also prescribes capital punishment for offenses including working on the Sabbath, blasphemy, adultery, and cursing one's parents.³¹ If the Bible is the foundation of objective morality, then these commands would be objectively moral. Most Christians today reject these conclusions, which means they are implicitly applying moral standards external to the Bible—demonstrating that moral reasoning operates independently of biblical authority.³²

The independence of morality

The evidence reviewed here suggests that morality neither requires God nor depends on religious belief for its practice. The Euthyphro dilemma poses a fundamental logical problem for divine command theory that has resisted solution for over two millennia. Cross-cultural anthropology has documented moral universals that transcend particular religious traditions. Evolutionary biology and primatology have identified the building blocks of morality in non-human animals. Philosophy has developed sophisticated secular ethical frameworks. And empirical sociology has shown that secular societies maintain robust moral standards, often exceeding those of more religious societies on measurable outcomes.^{1, 7, 10, 21}

None of this proves that God does not exist, or that religious practice is without value, or that religious ethics have nothing to offer. Many religious ethical traditions contain profound wisdom about human nature, moral development, and the good life. The point is narrower: the claim that morality requires God is not supported by philosophical analysis or empirical evidence. Humans appear capable of developing and maintaining moral behavior through their natural faculties, social relationships, and rational reflection, without requiring supernatural intervention or divine command.^{10, 11}

The practical implications are significant. If morality does not require God, then atheists and religious believers can engage in moral dialogue on equal footing, each drawing on their own sources of moral insight. Secular societies need not fear moral collapse. And religious believers can recognize that their moral convictions may have natural as well as supernatural foundations, which is not a threat to faith but a recognition of how humans actually function as moral beings.²²